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This   article investigates the relation between accounting-based 
earnings quality attributes and the financial status of Chinese 
companies  listed in Shanghai  and  Shenzhen stock exchanges 
from 2005   to 2007   by classifying  them as either “healthy”  or 
“bankrupt” firms. The  authors find that accruals quality, earn-           
ings predictability, and  earnings  smoothness are significantly 
different between healthy and bankrupt firms, but not earnings 
persistence. Additional analysis undertaken indicates that firm cat- 
egories (healthy, financially distressed, and bankrupt) based on 
financial status does not indicate distinct differences in earnings           
quality attributes. 
 
KEYWORDS  financial   status,   healthy,   bankrupt,  earnings 
quality, China 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Due  to the  administrative governance approach adopted in China,  regula-     
tors often rely  on accounting numbers to govern  the listed  companies (Lu & 
Liu, 2007).  For example, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
requires listed  firms to meet  certain  level  of return  on equity (ROE) before 
they  can  apply for a permission to issue  additional shares  to existing share- 
holders  (rights  issues); and the most important  criterion  for delisting a listed       
company is a reported net loss for three  consecutive years  (Qi,  Wu, & Wu, 
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2005).  A peculiar feature  of Chinese-listed firms  is that  some  of them  that 
should  be declared as financially distressed and/or  should  be declared as 
bankrupt (in terms of the criteria  used  in developed countries) are still being 
listed  on the stock  markets  in China,  in contrast  with  those  in mature  stock   
markets  in developed countries (Ronen  & Yaari,  2008). 
Altman  (2006)   developed  an  emerging  market   score   model   (EMS)  
Z score   to  categorize  firms  as  healthy,  financially  distressed,  or  
bankrupt. The  firms  listed   on  the  emerging  stock  markets   of  China  can  
be  identified  under   the  EMS model   due   to  the  earlier   noted   peculiarity 
of  the  listing  status  of Chinese  stock  markets. Borrowing the  EMS model  Z 
score to  categorize  Chinese-listed firms  into  two  categories, this  study   
investi- gates   the  status  of  accounting-based earnings  quality  attributes   
between healthy and  bankrupt firms  as  the  key  investigation and  
earnings quality attributes  between healthy, financially distressed, and  
bankrupt firms  as  a  supplementary investigation. Francis,  LaFond,  Olsson,  
and  Schipper (2004) identified four  accounting-based earnings quality 
attributes  (accruals quality,  persistence, predictability, and  smoothness) and  
market-based earnings quality attributes  (relevance, timeliness, and  
conservatism). This study  uses accounting-based earnings  attributes   only  
as  the  EMS model   firm  classi-   fication  is  built  upon  accounting data  
rather  than  market  data.  Although we  do  not  rule  out  the  notion  that  
market-based earnings  attributes   can inform about  the two firm categories 
under  the EMS model,  given  our focus on  accounting-based earnings 
quality, it is  more  appropriate to deal  with market-based earnings 
attributes  in a separate study.  Our findings  suggest that the bankrupt firms 
have  the lower  earnings quality measured in regards to accruals quality, 
earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness, but not as regards earnings 
persistence. 
Our  two  motivations for this  study  contribute to the  literature as  fol- 
lows.  First, to the best of our knowledge, no research has been  conducted to  
ascertain the status of the four accounting-based earnings attributes  (accruals 
quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and  earnings smooth- 
ness)  among  the two principal firm categories (healthy and bankrupt) using   
the  EMS Z score  criterion. Second, our  research article  is  one  of the  few 
analyses  of  accounting-based earnings quality  attributes   across  the  listed   
firms  of the  emerging Chinese  market,   based   on  the  assumption in  prior 
literature that desirable earnings qualities can reduce the information risk to 
investors  in their decision making. 
The next section outlines a review of relevant literature and firm classifi- 
cation based  on financially-healthy status.  Then, we explain the measures of  
earnings quality and develop hypotheses. After that, we design the  research 
method,   followed by t h e  analyses on our  empirical  results.  Finally,   we 
conclude our research. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND FINANCIAL STATUS 
CLASSIFICATION 
 
The literature to date  has characterized four earnings attributes  as indicators  
of  earnings  quality:  accruals  quality,  earnings  persistence,  earnings  pre- 
dictability, and  earnings smoothness (Francis  et al.,  2004).  Accruals quality 
refers  to the extent  to which  accruals map  onto  the related cash  flow  real- 
ization,  when  accruals shift or adjust  the recognition of cash flows over time 
so that the adjusted earnings becomes a better measure of firm performance  
(Boonlert-U-Thai, Meek,  & Nabar,  2006).  Earnings persistence  captures the 
concept of earnings sustainability; persistent earnings are  viewed as  desir- 
able  because they  are recurring (Penman & Zhang,  2002; Richardson, 2003). 
Earnings predictability  refers  to  the  ability  of  current  earnings to  predict 
future earnings. Earnings smoothness refers to the use of accruals to smooth   
earnings using  management’s private  information to reflect  earnings more 
accurately with  cash  flows  from  operations;  low  smoothness means   that 
a  firm’s  management has  not  engaged in  smoothing practices (Chaney & 
Lewis,  1995; Demski,  1998; Ronen & Sadan,  1981). 
The  literature  contains   several  possible  earnings  quality  constructs.  
Schipper and Vincent (2003)  provided three  such constructs, including three 
derived from the  time-series properties of earnings: persistence (measured 
as earning persistence), predictive value  (measured as earnings predictabil- 
ity), and variability (measured as accruals quality, and earnings smoothness). 
Although  earnings persistence and predictive value  might typically go hand-   
in-hand, Schipper and  Vincent  noted  that  volatile earnings might  be high 
quality as  measured by  persistence, but  low  quality as  measured by  pre- 
dictive   value. Francis,  Olsson,  and  Schipper (2008)   focused on  how  the 
precision of financial information in capturing one  or more  underlying val- 
uation constructs   affects  the  assessment  and  use  of  that  information  by   
investors. 
The EMS model  is a predictive model  that combines four different  finan- 
cial  ratios  to determine the likelihood of bankruptcy among  firms using  a Z 
score index  (Altman,  2006).  This model  was  first developed in the mid-1990s 
to  provide   an  analytical  framework for  the  analysis of  the  then-growing,    
 but still nascent−emerging market  firms issuing bonds in non-local currency 
(usually U.S. dollars) (Altman,  2006).  In the Chinese  capital  market  context, 
unusual to  many  other  stock  exchanges, some  firms  are  in  financial dis- 
tress  or bankrupt in  terms  of the  criteria  used  in  developed  countries but 
are  still being  listed  on the stock  exchanges, flagging their near-bankruptcy    
 or  bankruptcy status  to  investors.  Therefore, bankrupt  firms  have  a  pre- 
bankruptcy status in the Chinese  stock markets. Due to the anomalous listing 
system  in the Chinese  stock  exchange, we  use  the EMS model  to split sam- 
ple  firm-year  observations into healthy, financially distressed, and  bankrupt 
categories using  Z scores  of firm-year  observations.  
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The EMS model  is as follows  (Altman,  2006): 
 
EM Score  = 6.56∗X1 + 3.26∗X2 + 6.72∗X3 + 1.05∗X4 + 3.25    (1) 
Zones of discrimination: 
Z > 5.65 – Safe Zone (indicating healthy firms in this study) 
1.75 < Z < 5.65 – Grey Zone (indicating financially distressed firms in this 
study)   
Z < 1.75 – Bankruptcy (indicating bankrupt firms in this study). 
 
 
where, 
 
X1 = working capital/total assets 
X2 = retained earnings/total assets 
X3 = EBIT/total assets                                                                                                 
X4 = book  value  of equity/total liabilities. 
 
 
The constant  term of 3.25 in the Model  1 is derived from the median Z 
score for bankrupt U.S. entities,  to standardize the analysis so that a default  
equivalent rating is consistent with a score below 1.75 (Altman, 2006). Altman 
(2006)  stated  that the  EMS model  was  tested  on  samples of manufacturers 
and  non-manufacturers, public   firms,  private  firms,  and  specific   industries 
(e.g.,  retailers, telecoms, airlines, etc.),   more  than  20  countries including 
China,  and  its accuracy and  reliability have  remained high.  The foundation 
of the  EMS model  is  an  enhancement of the  Z score  model,   resulting in 
an EMS and  its associated bond  rating  equivalent (BRE) (Altman,  2006).  The 
EMS rating equivalent is then modified based on three critical  factors: (1) the 
firm’s  vulnerability to currency devaluation, (2)  its industry  affiliation, and 
(3) its competitive position  in the industry  (Altman,  2006). 
 
 
 
3. MEASURES OF EARNINGS QUALITY AND RELEVANT 
H YPOTHESES 
 
The idea  behind  the hypotheses for this study  follows  from Rosner  (2003).     
Rosner examined U.S. firms under four categories: non-stressed and non- 
bankrupt, stressed and non-bankrupt, non-stressed and bankrupt, and 
stressed and bankrupt. In that study, a given firm’s stress was an ex-ante 
measure, and bankruptcy was an ex-post measure. The firm classification is 
based on the criteria developed by McKeown et al. (1991). Although their 
classification has a similar  analogy to Altman (2006) firm  classification as 
healthy, financially distressed, and bankrupt, their study assigns stressed- 
bankrupt status  to  a  firm  if  it  exhibited any  of  the  following  symptoms: 
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(1)  negative working capital  in the  current  year,  (2)  an  earnings loss  from 
operations in any  of the three  prior  years  to bankruptcy year,  (3)  an  earn-     
ings  loss  in any  of the  three  prior  years  to bankruptcy year,  (4)  a retained 
earnings deficit in any of the three prior years  to bankruptcy year.  According 
to the  firm  classification advanced  by  McKeown  et  al.,  a  firm  later  going 
into (ex-post) bankruptcy but not showing any  of the four symptoms prior 
to bankruptcy was  identified as non-stressed and  bankrupt, and  a firm later     
avoiding bankruptcy but showing any  of the four symptoms was  identified 
as stressed and  non-bankrupt. Rosner (2003) examined income-increasing 
earnings manipulation of these  four firm categories using  various  proxies: 
receivables and  inventory overstatement; payables  and  accrual  expenses  
understatement;  net  working  capital/current accruals overstatement; 
property, plant and  equipment overstatement; and  poor  cash  flow indicators. 
Rosner  found that  firms  that  appear  (ex-ante)  non-stressed and  (ex-post)  
bankrupt hid their financial stress through  earnings manipulation, 
resembling Securities Exchange Commission–sanctioned fraud firms. 
Although   this  study  examines earnings quality attributes   rather  than 
earnings  manipulation as  Rosner  (2003)   did,  she  demonstrated that  firm 
behavior can  be  studied   under   broad  firm  classifications. A firm  
classification,  specifically ex-ante non-stressed and  ex-post  bankrupt are  
likely to hide  their  earnings quality through  earnings manipulation. Using  
Rosner  as a learning platform,  we  classify  firms into broad  spectra, but we  
posit  that the firm classification put forward  by McKeown  et al. (1991)  is 
inappropriate to Chinese  listed  firms,  because Chinese  stock  exchanges 
allow  firms  that are  technically bankrupt by  Western  norms  to continue 
their  listing  status, making them  ex-ante bankrupt firms. We instead use 
Altman’s  (2006) firm classification that uses financial  status as  the  construct  as
McKeown  et  al.’s  study  did to  identify firms  as  healthy,  financially dis- 
tressed, and  bankrupt. Financially distressed firms under  Altman are  similar 
to McKeown  et al.’s  classification: non-stressed and  bankrupt, and  stressed 
and  non-bankrupt firms,  and  in  this  study  we  disregarded  financially dis-
Tressed  firms for the main  empirical model,  because as found by Rosner it is   
likely that they  manipulate earnings, and  their earnings quality is driven  by 
earnings manipulation. 
In relation  to Altman’s  (2006)  Z score  that is founded on  the  strength 
of  firms’  balance sheets,   it  is  likely that  healthy firms  have  higher   earn- 
ings  quality than  bankrupt firms,  and  therefore these  firms’  categories are     
significantly different,  because strength  of accounting-based  information is 
more  important  in determining earnings quality attributes  (Barker & Imam, 
2008).  The choice  of the four accounting-based earnings attributes  are  cho- 
sen because each  attribute  informs a different  dimension of earnings quality. 
The  accruals quality  is  a  measure that  informs  about   the  cost  of  funds     
(debt  and  equity); earnings persistence informs  about  earnings recurrence 
or sustenance of earnings from  one  reporting period  to another; earnings 
6  
j,t−1 
 
predictability informs  about  earnings forecast  accuracy, an aspect  desirable 
to standard setters,  analysts, and firm valuations (e.g.  for mergers, and acqui-  
sitions);  and  earnings  smoothness informs  regarding the  extent  to  which    
190 managers have  contributed their privately-held information about  the 
firm to report  a more  useful  earnings number  (Francis  et al.,  2004).  Each 
earnings attribute  is outlined next. 
 
 
Accruals  Quality 
 
Accruals   quality as  a  measure of  earnings quality is  based   on  the  view     
that  earnings  can  be  matched more  closely into  cash  flow  from  opera- 
tions. Dechow  and Dichev (2002)  measured earnings quality as capturing the 
mapping of working capital  accruals onto  last-period, current-period, and 
next-period cash-flow from operations. A typical  Dechow–Dichev accruals 
quality measure begins  with  a  model  that  relates  total  current  accruals to    
lagged, current,  and  future  cash  flow  from operations (Francis  et al.,  2008). 
The  measure of  accruals quality in  this  study  is  based   on  Dechow   and 
Dichev’s  model  as follows: 
 
TCAj,t 
TotalAssetj ,t−1 
 
= b0 + b1 ∗ 
CFOj ,t−1 
TotalAssetj ,t−1 
 
CFOj ,t+1 
 
+ b2 ∗ 
CFOj ,t 
TotalAssetj ,t−1 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
 
where, 
+ b3 ∗ TotalAsset 
+ εj ,t 
 
TCA j, t   = Firm j’s total  current  accruals in t  (ΔCA j, t − ΔCL j, t − ΔCash j, t  
+ ΔSTDEBT j. t  + Δ TP j, t ) 
Total Assetj, t−1   = Firm j’s total assets  in year  t–1 
CFOj, t  = Firm j’s cash  flow from operations in year  t 
CAj, t  = Firm j’s current  assets  in year  t 
CLj, t  = Firm j’s current  liabilities in year  t  
Cashj, t  = Firm j’s cash  in year  t 
STDEBTj, t  = Firm j’s debt in current  liabilities in year  t 
TPj, t  = Firm j’s taxes  payable in year  t. 
 
The measure of accruals quality is based  on the  standard  deviation  of 
estimated residual σ(ε̂j, t ),  which  refers  to  the  extent  to  which  current 
accruals map  onto  operating cash-flow realizations. Large  (small) values of 
estimated residual correspond to lower  (higher) accruals quality and  lower 
(higher) earnings quality.  
Accruals   quality measures the  precision with  which   accruals predict 
future  cash  flows  (Dechow & Dichev,  2002;  Francis,  LaFond,  Olsson,  &    
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Schipper,  2005;  McNichols,  2002).   Prior  evidence that  firms  with  higher 
accruals quality have  lower  cost of capital  suggests that high-quality accruals 
improve  firms’ earnings-based valuation (Aboody, Mary, & Ron, 2004; Francis 
et al.,  2004).  We expect that healthy firms have  a cash-flow position  in the 
past,  present, and  future  and  that  are  most  likely to mirror  their  accruals,    
thereby informing  higher  accruals quality. The bankrupt firms, on the other 
hand,  are  likely to have  a poor  cash  flow  position  in the past,  present, and 
future  and  are  less  likely to match  their  accruals with  cash-flow position, 
thereby informing   lower  accruals quality. Based  on  our  expectations, we 
state the hypothesis of accruals quality as follows:                                             
 
Hypothesis 1:  Accruals  quality in  healthy firms  is significantly higher  than 
that of bankrupt firms. 
 
 
Earnings Persistence 
 
To measure persistence, researchers generally estimate  a regression of the 
future value  of the variable on its current  value  (Dechow & Schrand,  2004).     
Sloan (1996)  evaluated whether cash flow from operations and accruals have 
different  implications for the  persistence of future  earnings and  tested  the 
ability  of earnings to forecast  future earnings, concluding that those earnings 
that can accurately forecast  future earnings are more persistent. 
Kormendi  and  Lipe  (1987)  used  firm-level  regressions of current  earn-     
ings  on previous year’s  earnings to estimate  the  slope-coefficient estimates 
of earnings persistence. This study  employs the  measure in Kormendi  and 
Lipe to test earnings persistence using  the following equation: 
 
 
 
 
 
where, 
Earnj ,t 
TotalAssetsj,t−1 
 
= α + δ1  ∗ 
Earnj ,t−1 
TotalAssetj ,t−1 
 
+ Vj ,t (3) 
 
Earnj, t  = Firm’s j net income  before  extraordinary items in year  t  
Earnj, t−1   = Firm’s j net income  before  extraordinary items in year  t−1. 
 
The  measure  capturing earnings  persistence  is  based   on  the  slope- 
coefficient estimate   (δ1 ).  Values  of  δ1   close  to  one  (or  greater   than  one) 
indicate highly persistent earnings whereas values close  to zero imply  highly 
transitory  earnings. Persistent  earnings are viewed as higher  quality,  whereas 
 transitory earn ings  are viewed as lower  quality. 
Earnings persistence refers to the likelihood a firm’s earnings levels  
will recur  in  future  periods (Nichols  & Wahlen, 2004).  However, when   
firms report  earning losses,   it  can  be  that  those  firms  recognize expected 
loss transactions as incurred in that reporting period  (Basu,  1997).  By 
including    
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these  expected but unrealized losses  in a current  reporting period, the firm 
converts  a  series  of future  loss  transactions into  a  single  transitory  loss  as 
reported in  the  current  period. Secondly, losses  can  also  indicate that  the 
firm is likely to liquidate the assets  generating the loss (Hayn,  1995).  Third, a 
realized loss could  result  from a negative shock  accompanied by liquidation    
of assets  or cash  expenditures. The negative shocks  are  likely to be imme- 
diately realized, whereas positive  shocks  are  realized gradually over  time. 
These factors  make  earning losses  less  persistent than  earning gains  (Hayn, 
1995).  Because bankrupt firms have  poor  balance sheets  partly  because  of 
more  earning losses  made  over  the reporting periods, we  expect bankrupt    
firms to demonstrate less persistent earnings than healthy firms. We state the 
hypothesis of earnings persistence as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Earnings  persistence of healthy firms  is  significantly higher 
than that of bankrupt firms. 
 
 
Earnings  Predictability  
 
Dichev and Tang (2009)  investigated the relation  between earnings volatility 
and earnings predictability and found  a negative relationship between earn- 
ings volatility  and earnings predictability. They also concluded that earnings 
volatility  has  substantial predictive power  spanning up  to 5 years  into  the 
future.   
Lipe (1990)  provided a measure of earnings predictability as it reflects 
the variance of earnings shocks: with the increase in variance, the predictabil- 
ity decreases. Francis et al. (2004)  measured earnings predictability using  the 
square root  of  the  estimated error-variance from  the  earnings-persistence 
equation. In this study,  earnings predictability is calculated using  the square    
root of the error variance from equation of earnings persistence: 
 
                                                                              )ˆ( ,
2
, tjtjPred νσ=
                                            (4) 
 
where, 
 
σ 2   ( ν̂j,t ) = Estimated-error variance  of  firm  j in  year   t,  calculated  from 
Equation  3. 
 
Our measure of earnings predictability is the standard deviation of the     
residuals ( ν̂j,t ) from Equation  3. Large values of Pred j,t  imply  less predictable 
earnings and lower  earnings quality. 
A  number   of  important   applications of  accounting data  require  the 
prediction of earnings. For example, valuation research and  practice typi- 
cally  use  projections of earnings to derive  estimates of firms’ equity value.    
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A related  application is the  use  of accounting data  to derive, and  possibly 
improve  on, analysts’ earnings forecasts. Dichev and Tang (2009)  found  that 
the consideration of earnings predictability brings  substantial improvements 
in the  prediction of short-  and  long-term earnings, reducing errors  in pre- 
dictability. We expect healthy firms to have  more  predictable earnings than     
bankrupt firms, which  are likely to have  more earning losses,  and  are likely 
to engage in pernicious earnings management. We  state  the  hypothesis  of 
earnings predictability as follows: 
 
 
Hypothesis 3: Earnings predictability in healthy firms is significantly higher 
than that of bankrupt firms.   
 
 
Earnings  Smoothness 
 
Discussions  of  the  benefits   of  smooth   earnings  include  Demski   (1998), 
Wysocki (2004),  and  Francis  et al.  (2004).  Arguments  that  smoothness is a 
desirable earnings attribute  derive  from the view  that managers use their pri- 
vate  information about  future  earnings to smooth  out transitory  fluctuations    
and  thereby achieve a  more  representative, hence   more  useful,   reported 
earnings number. 
In measuring smoothness, Leuz, Nanda,  and  Wysocki (2003)  used  cash 
flow from operations as a reference construct  for unsmoothed earnings and 
measure  smoothness as  the  ratio  of earnings variability (i.e.,  smoothed) to   
310 cash  flow  from operations variability (i.e.,  unsmoothed). Bowen, 
Rajgopal, and  Venkatachalam (2003)  measured earnings smoothness as  the  
standard deviation of cash  flow from operations divided by the standard 
deviation of earnings. Francis  et al. (2004)  measured earnings smoothness as 
the ratio of standard deviation of net income  before  extraordinary items as 
proposed by Bowen  et al.  but  standardized them  by  lagged total  assets,  
and  this  study employs the following equation: 
 
                                                                                                                (5) 
 
where, 
 
σ = Firm j’s standard deviation 
CFOj, t  = Firm j’s operating cash flows  in year  t  
∑(Earn j, t ) = Firm j’s net income  before  extraordinary items in year  t. 
 
 
Ratios in excess of one indicate more variability in operating cash flows 
relative to the  variability of earnings, indicating a wider  disparity between 
unsmoothed earnings and smoothed earnings. The disparity is considered to 
)/(
)/(
1,,
1,,
,
−
−=
tjtj
tjtj
tj TotalAssetEarn
sTotalAssetCFO
Smooth
σ
σ
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be due  to the practice of using  accruals inappropriately. Thus, large  (small)    
values of smooth  indicate more  (less)  earnings smoothness and  low  (high) 
earnings quality. As  noted  earlier, the  financial  statements of  near-bankrupt 
firms  are more likely to reflect  evidence of material overstatements, 
presumably motivated  by  a  desire  to conceal signs  of distress,  than  those  
of non-bankrupt firms (Rosner,  2003). 
An  earnings management strategy   that  has  survived the  test  of  time is  
smoothing. Smoothing   can  be  the  outcome in  some  circumstances,  for 
instance, due  to  the  dampening of  fluctuations in  the  series   of  reported 
earnings (Buckmaster, 2001). Due to the administrative governance approach    
adopted in China,  the regulators often rely  on accounting numbers to gov- 
ern the listed  companies, and  the CSRC requires listed  firms to meet  certain 
benchmarks on  ROE before  they  can  apply for permission to issue  addi- 
tional  shares   to  existing shareholders (rights  issues). The  most  important 
criterion  for delisting a  listed  company is reported net  loss  for three  con-     
secutive years. Poor-performing firms,  such  as those  that are  bankrupt, are 
likely to use  private  perniciously managed earnings through  inappropriate 
use  of accruals are  less  representative of firms’ cash  flows  from operations. 
We believe that bankrupt firms are more  likely to manipulate their earnings 
to avoid  delisting and  have  strong  incentives to manage earnings to meet     
necessary thresholds, and that healthy firms are less likely to do so. We state 
the hypothesis of earnings smoothness as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 4:  Earnings  smoothness in  healthy firms  is  significantly higher 
than that of bankrupt firms. 
 
 
  4. METHOD 
 
Sample 
 
The  sample comprises firms  that  issued   A-shares  and  were   listed  on  the 
Shanghai and  Shenzhen stock  exchanges for the  fiscal  years  2005  to 2007. 
This study  measures the four accounting-based earnings attributes  on a firm- 
and year-specific basis,  using  the relevant accounting information for rolling     
5-year  windows, t-4,  . . .  t.  For example, the  firm-years 2001  to  2005  are 
used  to calculate the  earnings attributes   for the  year  2005,  the  firm-years 
2002 to 2006 for the year  2006, and  the firm-years 2003 to 2007 for the year 
2007.  Because the computation of accruals quality requires past  and  future 
one  firm-year’s observation data,  so we  cover  the data  period  from 2000 to    
2008. 
To mitigate  concern that missing  information in firm-year  observations 
might  reduce validity, we  ensure that data  on all variables are  available for 
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each  firm-year   observation for  the  sample period. The  data  are  collected 
from the  China  Stock  Market  and  Accounting Research  (CSMAR) Financial    
Databases developed  by  the  Shenzhen GTA Information   Technology Co. 
After  eliminating firms in banks  and  financial institutions, the  final  sample 
has  a  total  of  2,961  firm-year   observations for  the period  2005  to  2007, 
which consisting of    1,046  healthy, 1,669 financially distressed and  246  
bankrupt firm-year  observations respectively.  
 
 
The Model and Variables 
 
The  study  includes accrual quality of earnings (AQ),  persistence of earn- 
ings (PERS), predictability of earnings (PRED), and  smoothness of earnings 
(SMOOTH) as dependent variables in four separate econometric models  to 
examine the  relationship between earnings quality attributes, and  healthy  
versus  bankrupt firms.  Table  1 summarizes the  operational dependent and 
independent  variables,  and   their  measurement  attributes.  The  following 
regression  equation  tests  data  by  pooling  firms  across   3  years. We  use 
random-effect estimation in the panel  data set, as variations among  firms are 
of interest  in this study,  and  helps  in generalizing findings  to Chinese-listed    
firms. 
 
Dependent Variableit = b0  + b1 HVSBit + b2 CFOit + b3 SALESit + b4 SIZEit 
 
+ b5 OPCYCLit + b6 NEGEARNit  + z 
(6) 
 
t = 2005, 2006, and 2007 years, and i is firm-year  observation. 
 
In this econometric model,  higher  AQ value  means  lower  earnings qual- 
  ity.  Higher  PERS value  means  higher  earnings quality. Higher  PRED value  
means lower  earnings quality. Higher SMOOTH value  means  lower  earnings              
  quality. We identify  healthy firms as those  with an EMS Z score  greater  than 
5.65, financially distressed as those with an EMS Z score between 5.65 and 1.75,  and  
bankrupt firms  as  those  with  an  EMS Z score  less  than  1.75.  We  control  for 
cash  flow  variability (CFO), sales  variability (SALES), firm size (SIZE),  
operating cycle length (OPCYCL),  and  negative earnings ( NEGEARN) in  the  
past  5 years. The  cash-flow volatility and  sales  volatility  indicate uncertainty 
of earnings and  lower  earning quality.  Larger  firms are  likely to maintain 
higher  earnings quality than  smaller firms.  The longer  operating cycles  
indicate greater  uncertainty of earnings, and  lower  earnings quality. The 
negative earnings are  past  earnings losses; any  estimations made  about  
earnings during  the  loss  period  can  indicate substantial estimation errors,  
and  indicates lower  earnings quality (Dechow & Dichev,  2002). 
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TABLE 1 Variable  Definitions  and Measurement 
 
Variable  Proxy  Measurement Expected  Values 
 
Dependent 
AQ Accrual  quality Standard  deviation of the estimated residual using 
Dechow  and Dechev  (2002)  regression model  where 
total current  accruals are related  to previous, current, 
and future period  cash flows,  using  five-year rolling 
window 
PERS Earnings  persistence Slope  coefficient between current  period  earnings 
regressed over previous period  earnings using 
Kormendi  and Lipe (1987)  regression model,  using  a 
five-year rolling  window 
PRED Earnings  predictability Standard  deviation of the estimated residual using 
Kormendi  and Lipe (1987)  regression model  that 
estimate  earnings persistence, using  a five-year 
rolling  window 
SMOOTH Earnings  smoothness Ratio for standard deviation of the cash  flows  from 
operation over standard deviation of earnings in 
current  periods, using  Bowen  et al. (2003)  no 
constant  regression model,  using  a five-year rolling 
window 
 
 
−ve  to ∞ 
 
 
 
 
−ve  to ∞ 
 
 
 
0 to ∞ 
 
 
 
0 to ∞ 
Predictor 
H versus  B Healthy  versus  bankrupt firms  Firms evaluated for financial health  using  Emerging 
  (HVSB)                                                                                              Market Score (Z) of Altman (2006)  for each  firm year 
 
0 or 1  
                                                                                                      Healthy firm codes 1 and bankrupt firm codes 0.  
Control 
CFO Cash flows  Standard  deviation of firm’s cash  flows  from 
operations, calculated over 5-year  rolling  window for 
each  firm year  (Francis  et al., 2004) 
SALES Sales  revenue Standard  deviation of firm’s sales,  calculated over 
5-year  rolling  window for each  firm year  (Francis 
et al., 2004) 
 
0 to ∞ 
 
 
0 to ∞ 
SIZE Firm size  Log of firm’s total assets  for each  firm year  0 to ∞ 
OPCYCL Operating cycle  length  Log of firm’s operating cycle  for each  firm year  −ve  to +ve 
NEGEARN Negative  earnings Firm reporting negative earnings in any  of the past 
5 years  for each  firm year, which codes 1, 
otherwise, 0.  
0 or 1  
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5.  RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table  2 presents descriptive statistics.  Earnings  quality attributes  are  posi- 
tively  skewed, and with a wide  variation among  firms. However, we  inspect   
the  stem  and  leaf  plot  and  find  no  outliers   which   significantly influence 
findings.  The most firms’ AQ is around  0.04,  PERS is around  0.10,  PRED is 
around  0.03, and SMOOTH is around  0.06. The variables controlled for earn- 
ings  quality attributes  show  that the most likely values are  similar  to mean 
values of firm-year  observations, and this could  be because the values  were     
either  standardized by  log  value  (SIZE, and  OPCYCL), or  statistical   value 
(CFO, SALES). As evident from minimum values, some  AQ and PERS values 
because of firm-year  observations report  negative earnings, with  the  most 
likely scenario of these  firms  being  that  the  operating cash  flows  are  less 
volatile than earnings. All firms have  made  earnings losses  during  any of the     
past five years  prior to their firm-year  observations. 
Table  3  provides a  correlation matrix  for  variables. AQ,  PRED, and 
SMOOTH have  same  signs,  and  PERS has  opposite sign,  confirming that 
the  lower   values  of  the  former   three   indicate  higher   earnings  quality, 
and  the  lower  value  of PERS indicates lower  earnings quality. Cash  flows     
from operations variability significantly and  positively associate AQ, PRED, 
and  SMOOTHN. Firm-size  significantly and  negatively  associates with  all 
attributes  of earnings quality. The behaviou of firm size  with  earnings qual- 
ity attributes  and  sales  volatility  with  earnings quality attributes  (AQ, PERS, 
and  PRED) are  contrary  to our  expectations from  previous studies. These   
unexpected findings  are  due  to firms in the  study  widely differing  in cash 
flow  volatility  and  sales  volatility  as  evident from their  standard deviations 
being  much  larger  than  mean  values. Smaller  firms  are  likely to associate 
with higher  earnings quality, which  is contrary  to findings  from firms located 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Observation Mean  SD Minimum  Maximum  Median 
 
AQ 2961 0.13 0.47 −2.23 12.82 0.04 
PERS 2961 0.34 1.09 −17.13 14.97 0.10 
PRED 2961 0.15 0.48 0.00 8.95 0.03 
SMOOTH 2961 0.37 0.77 0.00 8.99 0.06 
CFO 2961 0.08 0.20 0.00 4.47 0.05 
SALES 2961 0.20 0.31 0.00 7.80 0.13 
SIZE 2961 9.27 0.50 6.15 11.27 9.27 
OPCYCL 2961 1.54 0.54 −3.74 4.32 1.49 
NEGEARN 2961 1.00 0.02 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Total 2,961 firm-year observations for the period 2005 to 2007; AQ = Accrual   quality; PERS = Earnings  
persistence; PRED = Earnings  predictability; SMOOTH = Earnings smoothness; CFO =  Standard 
deviation of cash flows scaled by assets; SALES = Standard deviation of  sales revenue scaled by assets; SIZE = 
Log of total assets; OPCYCL =  Log of operating cycle  length;  NEGEARN = Negative  earnings dummy. 
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TABLE 3 Correlation Matrixes 
 
AQ PERS PRED SMOOTH CFO SALES SIZE OPCYCL NEGEARN 
 
AQ 1 
PERS −0.034∗ 1 
 
Probability 
PRED 
0.063 
0.032∗ 
 
−0.038∗∗  
 
1  
Probability 0.078 0.039  SMOOTH 0.271∗∗∗  −0.099∗∗∗  0.007 1 
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.715  CFO 0.069∗∗∗  −0.014  0.136∗∗∗  0.145∗∗∗  1 
Probability 0.000 0.434 0.000 0.000   SALES 0.006 −0.009 0.037∗∗  −0.003 0.089∗∗∗  1 
Probability 0.732 0.633 0.044 0.889 0.000  SIZE −0.072∗∗∗  0.090∗∗∗  −0.209∗∗∗  −0.125∗∗∗  −0.081∗∗∗  0.005 1   
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.769    
OPCYCL −0.064∗∗∗  0.013 −0.031∗ −0.071∗∗∗  0.033∗ 0.226∗∗∗  0.326∗∗∗  1  
Probability 0.001 0.468 0.087 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.000   
NEGEARN 0.004 −0.004 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.006 −0.029 −0.005 1 
Probability 0.816 0.819 0.786 0.699 0.880 0.733 0.118 0.777  
Total 2,961 firm-year observations for the period 2005 to 2007; AQ = Accrual  quality; PERS = Earnings  persistence; PRED = Earnings  
predictability; SMOOTH = Earnings  smoothness; CFO = Standard deviation of cash flows scaled by assets ;  SALES = Standard deviation  of sales  
revenue scaled by assets; SIZE = Log of total assets;  OPCYCL = Log of operating cycle  length;  NEGEARN = Negative  earnings dummy. 
∗ Significant at better than the 10% level,  ∗∗ Significant at better than the 5% level,  ∗∗∗  Significant at better than the 1% level. 
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in  developed country   stock  markets. Firms  with  longer   operating cycles 
are  large  firms and  firms with  more  sales  volatility. Longer  operating cycle 
associates with  lower  earnings quality, and  negative earnings associate with 
lower  earnings quality. 
 
 
Regression Results 
 
As reported in Table 4, each  earnings quality attribute  is compared between    
healthy firms and bankrupt firms, and the finding  that each  earnings quality 
attribute  is significantly different  is demonstrated. 
Results   for  Accruals   Quality   (Hypothesis  1).  As  shown   in  Table   5, 
healthy firms  are  significantly higher   than  bankrupt firms  in  AQ of earn- 
ings  (b1   = –0.134,  probability = .033),  and  conform  to Hypothesis 1, with  
healthy 
firms reporting higher  accruals quality. Firms with  shorter  operating cycles 
reported higher  AQ than  those  having  longer  operating cycles. The  other 
established variables in the literature had no significant influence on accruals 
quality. 
 
 
TABLE  4  Results  of  Mean  Test  and  t  Test  for  Accounting-based Four  Earnings-Attributes 
Quality between healthy firms and bankrupt firms               
 
 
Mean Health firm Mean Bankrupt firm Difference  t Statistic 
 
Firm Number       1,046     246  
AQ 0.062 0.132 −0.070 −3.95∗∗∗  
PERS 0.671 0.438 0.233 1.67∗ 
PRED 0.035 0.240 −0.205 −11.22∗∗∗  
SMOOTH 0.076 0.302 −0.226 −7.54∗∗∗  
Sample of 1,292 firm-year observations consists of 1,046 healthy firm-years and 246 bankrupt firm-years;  AQ = Accrual   quality; 
PERS = Earnings  persistence; PRED = Earnings  predictability; SMOOTH = Earnings  smoothness. 
∗ Significant at better than the 10% level,  ∗∗∗  Significant at better than the 1% level. 
 
TABLE 5 Panel  Data Regression Results for Accruals  Quality 
 
 
Coefficient 
 
Standard 
Error (robust) Z score    Probability 
 
Confidence 
Interval  (low) 
 
Confidence 
Interval  (high) 
 
H versus  B −0.134∗∗  0.060 −2.24 0.025 −0.252 −0.017 
OPCYCL −0.074∗∗  0.035 −2.14 0.033 −0.142 −0.006 
NEGEARN 0.047∗∗∗  0.014 3.46 0.001 0.021 0.074 
CFO 0.194∗ 0.180 1.08 0.279 −0.158 0.546 
SALES −0.003 0.035 −0.09 0.931 −0.071 0.065 
SIZE −0.008 0.041 −0.20 0.844 −0.087 0.072 
Constant 0.389 0.382 1.02 0.308 −0.359 1.137 
Adjusted  R2 0.125      Observation 1,292      
Sample of 1,292 firm-year observations consists of 1,046 healthy firm-years and 246 bankrupt firm-years; H versus  
B = Healthy  versus  bankrupt firm dummy; OPCYCL = Log of operating cycle  length;  NEGEARN = 
Negative earnings dummy; CFO = Standard deviation of cash flows scaled by assets  flows scaled by assets;  
SALES = Standard deviation  of sales  revenue scaled by assets; SIZE = Log of total  assets. 
∗ Significant at better  than the 10% level,  ∗∗ Significant at better than the 5% level,  ∗∗∗ Significant at better 
than the 1% level. 
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TABLE 6 Panel  Data Regression Results for Persistence 
 
 
Coefficient 
 
Standard 
Error (robust) Z score    Probability 
 
Confidence 
Interval  (low) 
 
Confidence 
Interval  (high) 
 
H versus  B −0.153  0.272  −0.56  0.573  −0.687  0.380 
OPCYCL −0.132∗∗ 0.066  −1.99  0.046  −0.262  −0.002 
NEGEARN −0.347∗∗∗ 0.025  −13.93  0.000  −0.396  −0.298 
CFO 0.096  0.160  0.60  0.549  −0.218  0.410 
SALES 0.166  0.144  1.16  0.248  −0.115  0.447 
SIZE 0.436∗∗  0.172  2.54  0.011  0.099  0.772 
Constant  −2.954∗∗ 1.464  −2.02  0.044  −5.824  −0.084 
Adjusted  R2 0.100 
Observation 1,292 
 
Sample of 1,292 firm-year observations consists of 1,046 healthy firm-years and 246 bankrupt firm-years; H versus  
B = Healthy  versus  bankrupt firm dummy; OPCYCL = Log of operating cycle  length;  NEGEARN = 
Negative earnings dummy; CFO = Standard deviation of cash flows scaled by assets;  SALES = Standard 
deviation  of sales   revenue scaled by assets; SIZE = Log of total  assets. 
∗ Significant at better  than the 10% level,  ∗∗ Significant at better  than the 5% level,  ∗∗∗ Significant at better 
than the 1% level. 
 
 
Results  for Earnings  Persistence (Hypothesis 2).  Table  6 reports  results     
for persistence earnings quality. There  is no significant difference between 
healthy and  bankrupt firms in earnings persistence quality and  is not con- 
sistent with  Hypothesis 2 (b1   = –0.153,  probability = .573).  There  is less  
likelihood that firms that produce earnings gain  would  maintain their status 
quo,  or the firms that report  earnings losses  maintain their status quo over the 
reporting    periods. However, firms  with  shorter  operating cycles   positively 
and  significantly influence earnings persistence, as  a  shorter  operating cycle  
can reduce earnings uncertainty and allow  firms to maintain their earnings 
position with  greater  accuracy. Firms that report  negative earnings 
significantly associate with  lower  earnings persistence, suggesting greater  
uncertainty of    maintaining consistent earnings over reporting periods. 
Results   for   Earnings   Predictability  (Hypothesis  3).  As  reported  in 
Table 7, healthy firms are significantly higher  than bankrupt firms in earnings 
predictability (b1   = –0.292,  probability = .000).  This is consistent with  
Hypothesis 3, with  healthy firms  reporting higher  earnings predictability. 
Although earnings  losses  are  likely to behave in  a  more  variable fashion  
than  earnings gains,  because healthy and  bankrupt firms  have  made  
earnings losses  in any  of the  past  5 years  prior  to their  firm-year  
observations, the  impact  of earnings losses  on  earnings predictability is,  
therefore, not  a  distinct  feature for Chinese-listed bankrupt firms. Contrary  to 
prior studies, firms in this  study  with more volatile cash flows from operations 
report more predictable earnings, and firms with longer  operating cycles  
report  higher  earnings pre- dictability. The other established variables in the 
literature have no significant influence on earnings predictability. 
Results  for Earnings  Smoothness (Hypothesis 4).  As shown  in Table  8,    
healthy firms are significantly higher  than bankrupt firms in earnings smooth- 
ness  (b1   = –0.300,  probability = .002),  and  conform  to Hypothesis 4, with  
healthy 
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TABLE 7 Panel  Data Regression Results for Predictability 
 
 
Coefficient 
 
Standard 
Error (robust) Z score    Probability 
 
Confidence 
Interval  (low) 
 
Confidence 
Interval  (high) 
 
H versus  B −0.292∗∗∗  0.066 −4.43 0.00 −0.421 −0.163 
OPCYCL 0.063∗∗  0.030 2.09 0.04 0.004 0.121 
NEGEARN −0.016 0.024 −0.65 0.52 −0.063 0.032 
CFO 0.420∗∗∗  0.084  4.97  0.00  0.254  0.585 
SALES 0.000 0.040 0.00 1.00 −0.078 0.078 
SIZE −0.123∗∗∗  0.034 −3.62 0.00 −0.190 −0.056 
Constant 1.423∗∗∗  0.313 4.55 0.00 0.810 2.037 
Adjusted  R2 0.116      
Observation 1,292      
Sample of 1,292 firm-year observations consists of 1,046 healthy firm-years and 246 bankrupt firm-years; H versus  
B = Healthy  versus  bankrupt firm dummy; OPCYCL = Log of operating cycle  length;  NEGEARN = 
Negative earnings dummy; CFO = Standard deviation of cash flows scaled by assets;  SALES = Standard 
deviation  of sales   revenue scaled by assets; SIZE = Log of total  assets. 
∗ Significant at better  than the 10% level,  ∗∗ Significant at better than the 5% level,  ∗∗∗ Significant at better 
than the 1% level. 
 
TABLE 8 Panel  Data Regression Results for Smoothness 
 
 
Coefficient 
 
Standard 
Error (robust) Z score    Probability 
 
Confidence 
Interval  (low) 
 
Confidence 
Interval  (high) 
 
H versus  B −0.300∗∗∗ 0.095  −3.16  0.002  −0.486  −0.114 
OPCYCL −0.184  0.167  −1.10  0.270  −0.510  0.143 
NEGEARN 0.095∗∗∗  0.019  4.91  0.000  0.057  0.132 
CFO 0.318∗∗∗  0.112  2.84  0.005  0.098  0.537 
SALES −0.011  0.068  −0.16  0.870  −0.145  0.123 
SIZE 0.017  0.090  0.19  0.849  −0.159  0.193 
Constant  0.603  0.739  0.82  0.415  −0.846  2.052 
Adjusted  R2 0.04 
Observation 1,292 
 
Sample of 1,292 firm-year observations consists of 1,046 healthy firm-years and 246 bankrupt firm-years; H versus  
B = Healthy  versus  bankrupt firm dummy; OPCYCL = Log of operating cycle  length;  NEGEARN = 
Negative earnings dummy; CFO = Standard deviation of cash flows scaled by assets ;  SALES = Standard 
deviation  of sales   revenue scaled by assets; SIZE = Log of total  assets. 
∗ Significant at better  than the 10% level,  ∗∗ Significant at better than the 5% level,  ∗∗∗ Significant at better 
than the 1% level. 
 
 
firms reporting higher  accruals quality. Firms that report  more  volatile cash flows 
from operations, smaller  firms, and firms with shorter  operating cycles  positively 
influence higher  quality of earnings smoothness. In such instances,  
 it is likely that the private  information which  managers include to adjust earn- 
ings  through  accruals contribute to accurate matching of cash  flows  from 
operations volatility  with earnings volatility. 
 
 
Additional  Analysis 
 
As reported in  Appendix A,  we  identify   financially distressed (FD)  firms    
(1,669  firm-year  observations) as an additional firm category (FD = 0) and 
regress  pooled data  with  healthy firms (H = 1),  excluding bankrupt firms. 
Accruals   quality  and   earnings  persistence  are   not  significantly  different 
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between the  two  firm  categories, but  earnings predictability and  earnings 
smoothness are  significantly different.   We  conduct   an  analysis that  com-     
pares   financially-distressed firms  (FD  = 1)  and  bankrupt  firms  (B  = 0), 
excluding healthy firms.  The  negative earnings have  high  correlation with 
each  earnings attribute  in the  empirical model,  and  therefore  are  dropped 
from the  panel  data  regression. As reported in Appendix B, accruals qual- 
ity, and  earnings predictability are significantly different  between financially    
distressed and  bankrupt firms,  but  not  earnings persistence and  earnings 
smoothness. Findings  therefore suggest that financially distressed firms are 
similar  to healthy firms in relation  to accruals quality, and similar  to bankrupt 
firms in relation  to earnings smoothness. Financially distressed firms are sig- 
nificantly different  from healthy and  bankrupt firms in relation  to earnings    
predictability. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The findings  of this study  bring  several policy  implications to Chinese  reg- 
ulators.  The healthy firms are  significantly different  from bankrupt firms in  
relation  to accruals quality, earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness, 
but not earnings persistence. Additional  analysis reveals that financially dis- 
tressed  firms and bankrupt firms are significantly different  in relation  to two 
earnings attributes   (earnings predictability and  earnings  smoothness), but 
not  with  accruals quality. Financially distressed firms  are  not  significantly    
different  from  bankrupt firms  in  relation   to  earnings  smoothness. Hence, 
a presumption that all earnings attributes  behave significantly differently 
between healthy, financially distressed, and  bankrupt firms  should  not  be 
a  foregone conclusion. The  sample data  also  reveal  that  regardless of the 
firm  category,  Chinese-listed firms  make   negative earnings in  any  of  the     
preceding 5 years. 
Accruals  quality is significantly different  between healthy and  bankrupt 
firms,  and  financially distressed and  bankrupt firms,  but  it  is  not  
significantly  different  between healthy and  financially distressed firms.  
Although further  investigation is  necessary, it may  support  Rosner’s  (2003)  
findings that  financially distressed firms  engage in  earnings management 
to  show earnings with  high  accruals quality. As accruals quality is closely 
related to cash-flow forecasts  and firms’ cost of capital, on that basis,  it is 
possible that costs of capital  of financially distressed firms are  similar  to 
those  of healthy firms.  Healthy   and  financially  distressed firms  
significantly  differ  in  relation  to earnings smoothness, and  this difference 
is not significant between financially distressed and  bankrupt firms.  These  
facts  indicate to  Chinese policy makers that financially distressed firms 
emulate some  earnings quality  attributes  with  healthy firms,  and  other  
earnings quality attributes  with bankrupt firms, making it a grey  area  of firm 
classification. It is with caution that policy  makers should  make  conclusions 
about  the distinction of finan- cially  distressed firms in relation  to the four 
dimensions of accounting-based earnings quality. 
19  
Accruals  quality can  affect  cost  of capital, because it is  based  on  the 
accuracy of prediction of future cash flows,  and similarity of accruals quality    
behavior between healthy and  financially distressed firms  means  the  cost 
of  capital   is  unlikely to  increase when   the  firm  is  financially  distressed, 
but  can  significantly increase when   the  firm  is  in  bankruptcy status.  The 
earnings  persistence in  healthy firms  is  significantly different  from  that  in 
financially distressed and bankrupt firms and is likely to sustain  their earnings 
over  a  continuum. However, earnings volatility  has  an  impact  on  earnings 
predictability; as healthy firms are significantly different  from financially dis- 
tressed   and  bankrupt firms;  and  bankrupt firms  are  significantly different 
from healthy firms and  financially distressed firms. The private  information 
included by managers in accruals to determine earnings variability to match     
with  cash  flows  from  operations variability, makes   healthy firms  different 
from financially distressed and  bankrupt firms; and  bankrupt firms different 
from healthy and  financially distressed firms in relation  to earnings smooth- 
ness quality. A future study  investigating whether private  information relates 
to managing earnings enhances earnings quality for the benefit  of investors     
or  managing earnings enhances earnings quality  but  to  the  detriment  of 
investors,  could   assist  policy   makers to  supplement  the  findings   of  this 
study. 
The  novelty   of  this  research  is  that  we   classify   firms  as  healthy, 
financially distressed, and  bankrupt based  on  Altman  (2006)  EMS Z score     
criteria,   and  apply that  classification to  Chinese   listed  firms,  where tech- 
nically bankrupt firms  (according to  Western   norms)  are  being   listed  on 
the  Chinese   stock  exchanges, and  investigate the  differences of  earnings 
quality  attributes, contributing to  earnings quality literature. In  particular, 
this  research is probably among  the  first several comprehensive studies  to  
examine the listed  firms of the largest  emerging Chinese  capital  market. 
 
 
Limitations 
 
Our results  are, however, subject  to the following limitations. Because China  
is new to global  economic activity,  its economic system  and  business envi- 
ronment can have  an impact  on data availability and data quality. Due to the     
imperfect delisting system  in China,  we  use  the EMS model  to classify  firm- 
year  observations as healthy, financially distressed, and  bankrupt. Although 
the EMS model is tested in over 20 countries including China, the reliability of 
using  the EMS model  in China should  be further identified with its changing 
economic and political landscape.   
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Future Research 
 
This article  raises  several questions for future  research. First, future research 
  
could  use  a  bankruptcy model  that  is  industry   specific   to  investigate the  
differences in industry  characteristics on earnings quality attributes. Second,  
a future  study  could  investigate research questions in this study  with  other  
proxies for earnings quality, such  as the market-based attributes  (value rel-  
evance, timeliness, and  conservatism). Third,  a future  study  could  evaluate  
the  influence of non-financial information on  earnings quality attributes  of  
Chinese-listed firms,  which  is currently sparsely explored. Fourth,  a future  
study  could  consider earnings management in not-for-profit  firms in China,  
a topic barely articulated as yet in the accounting literature.  
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FD versus  B −0.079∗∗  0.011 −0.093∗∗∗  0.001 −0.121∗ 0.099 −0.068 0.127 
OPCYCL −0.056∗∗∗  0.003 0.029 0.376 0.001 0.981 −0.131 0.212 
CFO 0.161∗∗∗  0.005 0.266∗∗∗  0.004 −0.061 0.853 0.514∗∗∗  0.000 
SALES 0.018 0.339 0.024 0.323 −0.080 0.384 −0.015 0.759 
 
 
APPENDIX A  
 
Panel  Data Regression Results  for Earnings  Quality  Attributes  for Healthy  Versus  Financially 
Distressed  Firms 
 
AQ AQ  PRED PRED  PERS PERS   SMOOTH   SMOOTH 
Coefficient  Prob. Coefficient    Prob. Coefficient  Prob. Coefficient     Prob. 
 
H versus  FD 0.011  0.457    −0.042∗∗ 0.010  0.184∗∗∗     0.000    −0.082  0.004 
OPCYCL −0.015  0.200  0.018  0.545    −0.009  0.824    −0.004  0.887 
NEGEARN 0.066∗∗∗     0.000    −0.008  0.543    −0.085∗ 0.083  0.087  0.003 
CFO 0.140∗∗  0.021  0.247∗∗  0.015    −0.124  0.745  0.563  0.000 
SALES 0.006  0.765  0.028  0.328    −0.044  0.736    −0.036  0.402 
SIZE −0.024  0.261    −0.126∗∗∗     0.000  0.217∗∗∗     0.000    −0.133  0.015 
Constant  0.278  0.188  1.273∗∗∗      0.000    −1.644∗∗∗    0.005  1.497∗∗∗  0.004 
Adjusted  R2 0.07  0.04  0.09  0.06 
Observation 2,715  2,715  2,715   2,715 
 
Sample of 2,715 firm-year observations consists of 1,046 healthy firm-years and 1,669 financial distressed firm-years; 
AQ = Accrual  quality; PRED = Earnings  predictability; PERS = Earnings  persistence; SMOOTH =  
Earnings smoothness; H versus  FD = Healthy  versus  financial distressed firm dummy; CFO = Standard 
deviation of cash flows scaled by assets ; SALES = Standard deviation  of sales   revenue scaled by assets;; SIZE = 
Log of total  assets; OPCYCL = Log of operating cycle  length;  NEGEARN = Negative  earnings dummy.
                                                                             
∗ Significant at better  than the 10% level,  ∗∗ Significant at better  than the 5% level,  ∗∗∗ Significant at better 
than the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
Panel Data Regression Results for Earnings Quality  Attributes for Financially Distressed  Versus 
Bankrupt Firms 
 
AQ AQ  PRED PRED  PERS PERS   SMOOTH   SMOOTH 
Coefficient  Prob. Coefficient   Prob. Coefficient   Prob. Coefficient      Prob. 
 
 
 
 
 
SIZE −0.012  0.659    −0.197∗∗∗     0.000  0.234∗∗∗     0.000    −0.167∗∗ 0.017 
Constant  0.453∗  0.083  2.087∗∗∗      0.000    −1.648∗∗∗    0.001  2.228∗∗∗  0.000 
Adjusted  R2 0.03  0.09  0.11  0.05 
Observation 1,915  1,915  1,915  1,915 
 
Sample of 1,915 firm-year observations consists of 1,669 financial distressed firm-years and 246 bankrupt firm-years, 
AQ = Accrual  quality; PRED = Earnings  predictability; PERS = Earnings  persistence; SMOOTH =  
Earnings smoothness; FD versus H = Financial distressed versus bankrupt firm dummy; CFO = Standard 
deviation of cash flows scaled by assets; SALES = Standard deviation  of sales   revenue scaled by assets; SIZE = 
Log of total  assets; OPCYCL=Log of operating cycle  length;  NEGEARN = Negative  earnings dummy.                                                          
                        
∗ Significant at better  than the 10% level,  ∗∗ Significant at better  than the 5% level,  ∗∗∗ Significant at better 
than the 1% level. 
